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FOREWORD 
The central goal of the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis is to apply the craft of systems 
analysis to important national and international problems. 
To support and improve this work, the Instituteexplores 
its philosophical and scientific foundations, as well asthe 
lessons of practice. 
This paper focuses its attention on the centralconcep- 
tual issues of the field: the scientific nature of applied 
systems analysis, the search for standards of quality for 
it, its relation to problem solving, the craft aspects of 
the work, and the relation between argument and conclusion. 
The author has contributed significantly to clarifying 
foundational conceptions of appliedsystems analysis inother 
papers as well. Of these contributions, two related to this 
paper deservementionhere: G. Majone andE.S. Quade, editors, 
Pitfalls of Analysis (London: Wiley,1980), a volume in the 
International Serieson AppliedSystems Analysis; and G.Majone, 
"Policies as Theories," issued by IIASA as RR-80-17 (origi- 
nally published in Omega, - 8, 1980, pp. 151-162). 
Other papers dealing with the craft of systemsanalysis 
are in preparation. 
Hugh J. Miser 
Survey Project 
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1. "How Scientific is Applied Systems Analysis?" 
Like the legend~ry phoenix, the question: How scientific 
is sytems analysis? (or operations research, or management 
science) keeps rising alive from the ashes of past methodological 
debates and official definitions. For instance, more than 
twenty years ago, the Operational Research Society of Britain 
adopted a definition of OR in which the word "science" or 
"scientific" occurred three times. Operations research was 
proclaimed to be the application of the methods of science to 
complex problems, a discipline whose distinctive approach is 
the development of a scientific model of the system being 
analyzed, and whose purpose is to help management determine 
its policy and actions scientifically. 
Similarly, ~uade' observes that "It is easy to find state- 
ments in the literature of operations research which imply 
that analysis to aid any decision maker is really nothing more 
than the 'scientific method' extended to problems outside the 
realm of pure science," where "scientific method" is interpreted 
to mean that analysis advances through the successive steps of 
formulation, search, explanation, interpretation and, hopefully, 
verification. And according to Olaf Helmer, "in comparing 
operations research with an exact science, it is with regard 
to exactness that operations research falls short, but not 
necessarily with regard to the scientific character for its 
methods. I1 2 
Can anything of value be learned from these methodological 
discussions, anything, that is, that is useful to applied 
systems analysis (ASA) as it is practiced today? In this section 
I shall try to show that questions about the "scientific character" 
of ASA are, today, rather irrelevant, when not positively 
misleading, if taken literally; but, also, that they can 
be reformulated in a way that makes them highly meaningful for 
the practicing analyst. 
One problem with the older methodological discussions 
about the scientific nature of ASA is that, when the meaning of 
"scientific method" has not remained implicit (and hence open 
to a variety of different and often contrasting interpretations), 
it has been construed in terms which contemporary epistemology 
finds unacceptable, or at least in need of substantial revisions. 
Few scientists and philosophers of science still believe that 
scientific knowledge is, or can be, proven knowledge. If 
there is one point on which all major schools of thought agree 
today, it is that scientific knowledge is always tentative and 
open to refutation. And while the older history of science 
was little more than a chronicle of the irresistible advance 
of the different sciences, the contemporary historian tries to 
understand "how such sciences can succeed in fulfilling their 
actual explanatory missions, despite the fact that, at any 
chosen moment in time, their intellectual contents are marked 
by logical gaps, incoherences, and contradictions. 11 3 
However, the conceptual revolution that has taken place 
in the philosophy and history of science in the last three 
decades--a revolution commonly associated with the names of 
Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos--is having its impact on systems 
analysis and closely-related disciplines, as shown by some recent 
contributions to the literature. But even these methodologically 
more sophisticated and updated discussions often fail to explain 
what lies behind the persistent preoccupation with the scientific 
status of ASA. 
It is, of course, no secret that the claim to scientific 
status has in the past served an important ideological function 
by increasing the collective confidence of a group of new 
disciplines striving for academic and social recognition. But 
today science (or, rather, folk-science) has lost much of its 
ideological appeal, and it would be difficult to explain the 
scientific aspirations of the ASA profession on such grounds. 
Also, fallibilism--the currently accepted doctrine that scienti- 
fic arguments are never conclusive and always perfectible--seems 
to be a poor principle from which to derive mechanical rules 
of method. Finally, traditional claims to scientific status 
for ASA have always been faced by what appears to be an insolu- 
ble contradiction: if ASA is scientific, its task is not to 
prescribe or suggest a course of action, but to provide scienti- 
fic explanations and predictions; if, on the other hand, ASA 
aspires to guide action, it must be prescriptive (and, I shall 
argue, persuasive as well), and hence cannot be scientific-- 
not, at any rate, according to the received view of scientific 
method. Some writers have attempted to solve the dilemma by 
arguing that ASA offers "scientifically based" advice. But 
such an argument is logically unsound and runs immediately 
against the Humean impossibility of deriving "ought" from "is." 
So the question about the scientific status of ASA does 
indeed seem to lead nowhere, except into a thicket of conceptual 
obscurities and logical dilemmas. But then, why do methodologi- 
cally conscious analysts keep raising it? The reason, I suggest, 
is that behind this question loom two issues which people rightly 
feel to be of crucial importance, even if they are unable to 
clearly articulate them. First: what is the language of ASA, 
i.e., what is the logical status of the different propositions 
which an analyst produces in the course of his work? Second: 
which standards of quality and rules of methodological criti- 
cism are applicable to the different kinds of propositions? 
2. The Search for Standards of Quality 
Even if we interpret "science" in the broadest possible 
sense of an organized body of knowledge (the sense suggested, 
for example, by the German term "Wissenschaft"), the existence 
of generally recog3ized rules of evaluation and criticism is 
a necessary precondition for any reasonable claim to scientific 
status. Only in immature fields of inquiry, as Ravetz has 
pointed out, criteria of quality or adequacy cannot be taken 
for granted. 
The dilemmas facing the leaders of an immature field of 
inquiry have been shrewdly analyzed by Ravetz: 
The present social institutions of science, and of 
learning in general, impose such constraints that the 
growth andeven the survival of an immature field would 
be endangered by the simple honesty of public announce- 
ment of its condition. For these institutions were 
developed around mature or rapidly maturing fields in 
thenineteenth century. If the representatives of a 
discipline announce that they do not fit in with such 
a system, they can be simply excluded from it, to the 
benefit of their competitors for the perennially limited 
r e s o u r c e s .  The f i e l d  would be r e l e g a t e d  t o  amateur  
s t a t u s ,  and t h e r e b y  pushed o v e r  t o  t h e  v e r y  m a r g i n o f  
t h e  wor ld  o f  l e a r n i n g ;  it would be  d e p r i v e d  o f  f u n d s  
and p r e s t i g e .  
H e  c o n t i n u e s :  
An immature f i e l d ,  i n  chaos  i n t e r n a l l y ,  e x p e r i e n c e s  t h e  
a d d i t i o n a l  s t r a i n s  of  hyper t rophy ;  i t s  l e a d e r s  and prac-  
t i t i o n e r s  a r e  exposed t o  t h e  t e m p t a t i o n s  o f  b e i n g  a c c e p t e d  
a s  c o n s u l t a n t s  and e x p e r t s  f o r  t h e  r a p i d  s o l u t i o n  o f  
u r g e n t  p r a c t i c a l  problems.  The f i e l d  c a n  soon become 
i d e n t i c a l  i n  outward appearance  t o  a n  e s t a b l i s h e d p h y s i c a l  
t echno logy ,  b u t  i n  r e a l i t y  b e  a  g i g a n t i c  conf idence-  
game. . . To t h r e a d  o n e ' s  way t h r o u g h  t h e s e  p i t f a l l s ,  
making a  genu ine  c o n t r i b u t i o n  b o t h  t o  s c i e n t i f i c  knowledge 
and t o  t h e  w e l f a r e  o f  s o c i e t y ,  r e q u i r e s  a  combinat ion  o f  
knowledge and u n d e r s t a n d i n g  i n  s o  many d i f f e r e n t  a r e a s  
o f  e x p e r i e n c e ,  t h a t  i t s  o n l y  c o r r e c t  t i t l e  i s  w i ~ d o m . ~  
What, t h e n ,  does  t h e  "wisdom" o f  ASA i n c l u d e  (assuming,  a s  I 
t h i n k  w e  must ,  t h a t  it i s  a  s t i l l - m a t u r i n g  f i e l d ) ?  ASA i s  
concerned w i t h  t h e o r i z i n g  ( a t  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  of  g e n e r a l i t y ) ,  
choos ing ,  a n d a c t i n g .  Hence i t s  t h r e e - f o l d  c h a r a c t e r :  d e s c r i p t i v e  
( s c i e n t i f i c ) ,  p r e s c r i p t i v e  ( a d v i s o r y ) ,  and p e r s u a s i v e  (argumen- 
t a t i v e - i n t e r a c t i v e ) .  I n  f a c t ,  i f  w e  look  a t  t h e  f i n e  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  a n  a n a l y t i c  argument  w e  u s u a l l y  d i s c o v e r  a  complex b l e n d  o f  
f a c t u a l  s t a t e m e n t s ,  m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  c h o i c e s ,  e v a l u a t i o n s ,  recom- 
mendat ions ,  and p e r s u a s i v e  d e f i n i t i o n s  and communication a c t s .  
An even more complex s t r u c t u r e  would become a p p a r e n t  i f  w e  w e r e  
t o  i n c l u d e  ( a s  w e  s h o u l d ,  i n  a  comple te  t r e a t m e n t )  t h e  i n t e r -  
a c t i o n s  t a k i n g  p l a c e  between a n a l y s t s  and t h e i r  a u d i e n c e  o f  
c l i e n t s ,  s p o n s o r s ,  p o l i c y  makers ,  and i n t e r e s t e d  p u b l i c s .  
Moreover, d e s c r i p t i v e  p r o p o s i t i o n s ,  p r e s c r i p t i o n s ,  and p e r s u a s i o n  
a r e  i n t e r t w i n e d  i n  a  way t h a t  r u l e s  o u t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
a p p l y i n g  a  un ique  set  o f  e v a l u a t i v e  c r i t e r i a ,  l e t  a l o n e  
c o n c l u s i v e l y  p rov ing  o r  r e f u t i n g  a n  argument .  Whatever t e s t i n g  
can b e  done must r e l y  on a  v a r i e t y  o f  d i s c i p l i n a r y  s t a n d a r d s ,  
corresponding to the different techniques and methods used in 
the study, on the plausibility and robustness of the results, 
on the quality criteria of the clients, and even on such hard- 
to-formalize qualities as style and persuasiveness. For this 
reason, the historical pattern of development of ASA can be 
seen as "the slow business of getting to grips with the problems 
of devising patterns of criticism, of constructing critical 
methodologies, for those areas not readily dealt with by the 
m e t h o d s b u i l t u p o v e r s o l o n g a p e r i o d i n t h e n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s .  I! 7 
But why has the analytic profession been so slow in 
recognizing the importance and the necessary complexity of a 
relevant body of criteria and mechanisms of quality control? 
The reasons are, to a large extent, historical. The pioneers 
of systems analysis and operations research were natural 
scientists, many of them of outstanding ability, with a long 
experience in the actual conduct of empirical research. Their 
most important contributions to the new fields of inquiry were 
not advancedtheoretical insights or sophisticated research 
tools, but active minds, and a set of superb craft skills in 
recording, analyzing, and evaluating data, in establishing 
quantitative relationships, and in setting up testable hypotheses. 
Their main goal, as they saw it, was "to find a scientific 
explanation of the facts." For, as C.H. Waddington writes, 
"[olnly when this is done can the two main objects of opera- 
tional research be attained. These are the prediction of the 
effects of new weapons and of new tactics. 11 8 
Given this paradigm, the relevant standards of criticism 
were, of course, thoseof natural science. Indeed, the situations 
investigated by operations researchers during World War 2 were 
particularly well suited for this approach. Typically, military 
operations could be regarded, without distortion, as represen- 
tative of a class of repetitive situations "where theories built 
up in response to earlier examples of the situation could be 
checked out against later examples, monitored while proposals 
for improved action were in use, and used to detect their own 
dwindling validity as the situations changed. "' In the years 
immediately following the War, industrial applications of OR, 
exemplified by L. C.Ediels classic study "Traffic delays at toll 
still followed the standard pattern, and explicitly 
appealedtothe establishedcriteriaofevaluation andcriticism. 
But soon the situation began to change. While people like 
Blackett and Waddington were returning to their laboratories 
and research institutes, a new generation of analysts was enter- 
ing the scene--people primarily interested in the more formal 
aspects of scientific research, and often lacking the craft 
skills and the maturity of critical judgment of the old masters. 
At the same time, the problems claiming the attention of the 
analysts were becoming increasingly abstract and complex. 
Direct empirical verification of the conclusion was often 
impossible (as in the case of the strategic studies done at 
Rand), and the very notion of solution, except in the simplest 
situations, tended to become a matter of methodological agree- 
ment. In sum, as allegiance to the traditional standards of 
criticism was weakened by changes in the disciplinary background 
of the profession, the standards themselves were becoming 
increasingly irrelevant to current professional practice. 
3. Systems Analysis and Problem Solving 
And yet, the pioneers of OR were correct in asserting the 
existence of a strong similarity between operational and scien- 
tific research. Their mistake, from our present viewpoint, 
consisted in thinking that the similarity was to be found in 
the outcome ("scientific explanation of the facts," "prediction 
of the effects of new weapons and of new tactics"), rather 
than in the process, that is to say, in the basic craft aspects 
common to all types of disciplined intellectual inquiry. 
Shifting our perspective from outcome to process, the following 
points become almost obvious: 1 1  
1. Like scientific research, ASA is essentially a craft 
activity,Ort as some authors prefer to put it, an 
"art;" 1 la 
2. However, the objects to which analytic work is applied 
are not physical things and phenomena, as in the case 
of traditional arts and crafts, but intellectual 
constructs studied through the investigation of 
policy problems; 
3. The work of the systems analyst (and of the 
scientist as well) is guided and controlled by 
criteriawhich are mainly informal and tacit, rather 
than public and explicit. It is the task of a 
methodology of ASA to make these criteria as 
explicit as possible, as a preconditon for a critical 
discussion of their validity; 
4. The standards and criteria of quality used in 
evaluating analytic work must reflect the three- 
fold nature of ASA: descriptive, prescriptive, 
and argumentative. These standards are partly 
technical (reflecting the best practice in the 
field), and partly social (since their effective- 
ness depends on the existence of professional 
organizations and other institutional arrangements). 
In the discussion of these theses, the notion of "problem" 
plays a central role. In fact, ASA can be described as problem 
solving on intellectually constructed objects; and the different 
stages of analytic work roughly correspond to the phases of 
problem solving, from formulation to proposed solution. Thus, 
the craft character of the work is seen most clearly in the 
early stages, where the analyst interacts with the external 
world (collection of data, assessment of their reliability 
and transformation into information, modelling of the system 
under investigation, etc.); the social character is exhibited 
in the methodological choices and judgments which guide and 
control the analyst's work; the abstractness of the objects 
of inquiry is most obvious when we consider what is involved 
in "solving" a policy problem; while the influence of social 
processes is evident in the transformation of analytical 
recommendations into actual decisions and institutional changes. 
Perhaps the first thing to be noted in our characterization 
of ASA as problem solving is the difficulty of finding explicit 
criteria by which scientific problems may be distinguished 
from policy problems. Consider, for instance, the character- 
ization of scientific problemsthat has been proposed by Ravetz: 1 2  
a major part of the work is the formulation of the question 
itself; the question changes as Lhe work progresses; there is 
no simple rule for distinguishing a "correct" answer for 
"incorrect" ones; and there is no guarantee that the question, 
as originally set or later developed, can be answered at all. 
Only a moment's reflection is needed to see that policy problems 
exhibit the same characteristics; and if supporting evidence 
is wanted, this can be easily found in the literature of systems 
analysis. Thus, according to Quade,"the 'typical' systems 
analysis problem is often first: What is the problem?;" "The 
problem itself does not remain stationary. Interplay between 
a growing understanding of the problem and of possible develop- 
ments will refine the problem itself;" "There is frequently no 
way to verify the conclusions of the study. " I 3  Again: "The 
problems an analyst can be asked to tackle in the public sector 
are particularly frustrating. Usually they are urgent and ill- 
defined. Often they are complicated, and sometimes they change 
radically during the investigation. I! 1 4  
Or see what Eilon has to say about solving decision 
problems under uncertainty (which is, of course, the natural 
condition in any policy problem): "In all decisions under 
uncertainty . . . actual results often deviate substantially 
from predicted 'expected1 results (based on subjective probabili- 
ties). To say that the decision is still valid because one 
should compare the expected results not with the actual results 
but with their mean value (had the 'one-off' reality been re- 
peated many times) is of little help, since the statement is 
not testable." 1 5  
That policy problems may have no solution under the eco- 
nomic,political, and institutional constraints existing at a 
given moment in a given country should be obvious to anyone 
familiar with its administrative and legislative history. 
Indeed, it can be argued that the proper role of the analyst 
consists in establishing the conditions of feasibility of a 
proposed course of action, rather than in accumulating evidence 
in favor of a pet solution. As I have written elsewhere, "Too 
often we take it for granted that any social problem can be 
solved, if only sufficient resources are available. But the 
- 
manageability of a social task cannot be rationally discussed 
until we have specified the acceptable means of collective 
action, as well as the limitations imposed by the availability 
of resources, knowledge, and organizational skills. I1 16 
Thus, Ravetz's criteria do not allow one to separate policy 
problems sharply from scientific problems. The similarity is 
further emphasized by the shared abstract quality of the objects 
of both scientific and analytic inquiry. In this respect, 
systems analysis is actually more "theoretical" than many 
natural sciences. For, if it is true that even basic concepts, 
like "substance" in chemistry, or "force," "particle," and 
"field" in physics, are purely intellectual constructs, the 
more descriptive natural sciences operate largely with concepts 
whose concrete correspondents are fairly obvious. On the 
other hand, because of the abstract character of social and 
economic relations, all concepts appearing in the formulation 
or solution of a policy problem are necessarily the product 
of convention and definition. This is obvious in the case of 
terms like "price, " "cost, " "GNP, " "efficiency, " "need, " 
"urbanization," "pollution," but is equally true for concepts 
like "poverty," "health," "unemployment," "crime," which acquire 
operational meaning only when expressed in terms of legal or 
administrative definitions. Indeed, asAlan Coddingtonhas observed, 
"economic statistics are extremely abstract things," the product 
of "arbitrariness" an.3 "convention." 1 8  
The same holds true, a fortiori, of the social data (but 
even of most technical data) which represent such a large part 
of the numerical input of analytic studies. 
Although I have spoken, so far, only of problems, creative 
analysis usually begins with something less than a problem; we 
-. 
may callita "problem situation." This is an awareness that 
things are not as they should be, but there is no clear con- 
ception, as yet, of how they might be put right. An important 
part of the problem situation is the historical background 
and the "issue context" in which the policy debate takes place. 
It is obviously important for the analyst "to know as much as 
possible about the background of the problem--where it came 
from, why it is important, and what decision it is going to 
assist. 11 1 9 
But notice that, although the problem situation is in a 
less specified state than the problem to which it may give rise, 
it is already a very artificial thing. The very existence of a 
problem situation presupposes a matrix of technical materials: 
existing information, tools, and a body of methods including 
criteria of adequacy and value. 
4. Applied Systems Analysis as Craft Work 
Although craft aspects are evident in every phase of the 
analyst's work, I shall discuss them here with reference to the 
categories of data, information, tools, and pitfalls. 
Data. Data are the results of the first working up of the 
materials relevant to the investigation of a problem. In ASA 
data are often "found" rather than "man~factured," i.e., 
they are produced by observation rather than by experiment. 
This requires craft skills that are rather different, and in 
many respects more difficult to acquire, than those needed for 
the analysis of experimental data. For instance, the sampling 
process through which the data are obtained is very much influ- 
, 
enced by the methods used, the skill of the samplers, and a 
host of other factors which may lead to results quite unrepre- 
sentative of the general situation. Also, data are collected 
according to categorical descriptions which never fit perfectly 
the objects of the inquiry at hand. 
Data pertaining to preference and probability assessments 
are notorious for their subjectivity and unreliability. 
Even when data can be obtained from experimentation, as in 
the case of some recent large-scale social experiments, there 
is no guarantee that the best experimental design offers 
sufficient protection against dangers and pitfalls, of which 
the "Hawthorne effect" is only one of the best-known examples. 
Since perfection of data is impossible, the standards of 
acceptance will have to be based on a common judgment of what 
is good enough for the functions which the data perform in the 
problem treated by the analyst. This judgment depends in turn 
on the criteria of adequacy generally accepted for the solution 
of such problems. Thus, the simple judgment of soundness of 
data is a microcosmos of the personal judgments and accumulated 
social experience which go into analytic work. 20 
Information. At leastin quantitative terms, an excess, rather 
- 
than a scarcity, of data is the usual situation in ASA. Hence 
the need to reduce the mass of data, to rzfine them into a 
more useful and more reliable form. Data transformation 
involves a new set of craft skills, with the application 
of new tools (often of a statistical or mathematical nature), 
and the making of a new set of judgments. This new phase of 
the analyst's work, the production of information, can be 
illustrated by a number of examples: thecalculationof averages 
and other statistical parameters, the fitting of a curve to a 
set of points, the reduction of data through some multivariate 
statistical technique. The operations performed on the original 
data may be involved or quite simple, but they always represent 
a crucial step. Through these operations, the raw data have 
been transformed into a new sort of material, and from this 
point on the analysis is carried out only in terms of these 
new entities. 
This transformation of data into information involves three 
basic judgments, which all present the risk of serious pitfalls. 
The first is that the advantages achieved through data reduction 
compensate for the probable lossof information; generally speaking, 
the existence of "sufficient statistics," i.e., of summaries of 
the data which contain exactly the same amount of information as 
the original sample, is the exception rather than the rule. The 
second is a judgment of the goodness of fit of the model to the 
original data. The third is that this particular model, among 
the infinitely many possible ones, is the significant one for 
the problem under examination. All the operations and judgments 
involved in data reduction, transformation, and testing are, of 
course, craft operations. 
Tools. Analytic tools may be roughly ciassified in terms of 
data production, manipulation, and interpretation. 
The category of interpretive tools, which is of special 
importance here, includes "tool disciplines," i.e., other fields of 
natural or social science which must be mastered to some extent 
in order that competent analytic work may be done. 
Each set of tools has its characteristic pitfalls, and, 
if major blunders are to be avoided, the user must develop a 
craftsman's knowledge of their properties. For instance, the 
dangers inherent in the use (and abuse) of statistical tools 
have been often pointed out, although serious fallacies can 
still be detected even in standard applications. 
These dangers are made particularly acute by the prevailing 
metaphysics, accordingto which a field becomes more genuinely 
"scientific" as it more closely resembles theoretical physics 
in its mathematical formalization. Thus, in an attempt to give 
a more scientific appearance to his conclusions, the analyst 
is often induced to use formal tools that exceed the limits of 
his mathematical or statistical sophistication, and whose range 
of meaningful applicability he is therefore unable to assess. 
The consequences have been well illustrated by the mathematician 
Jacob Schwartz: 
Mathematics must deal with well-defined situations. 
Thus, in its relations with science mathematics depends 
on an intellectual effort outside of mathematics for the 
crucial specification of the approximation which mathematics 
is to take literally. Give a mathematician a situation 
which is the least bit ill-defined--he will first of all 
make it well defined. Perhaps appropriately, but perhaps 
also inappropriately .... The mathematician turns the 
scientist's theoretical assumptions, i.e. convenient points 
of analytical emphasis, into axioms, and then takes axioms 
literally. This brings with it the danger that he may 
also persuade the scientist to take these axioms literally. 
The question, central to the scientific investigation but 
intensely disturbing in the mathematical context-- what 
happens to all this if the axioms are relaxed?--is there- 
by put into shadow .... That form of wisdom which is the 
opposite of single-mindedness, the ability to keep many 
threads inhand,to draw for an argument from many disparate 
sources, is quite foreign to mathematics. This inability 
accounts for much of the difficulty which mathematics 
experiences in attempting to penetrate the social sciences. 2 1 
It is important to realize that the influence of tools on 
a field is more subtle than a mere opening up of possibilities. 
The extensive use of a tool involves shaping the work around 
its distinctive strengths and limitations; one can rarely apply 
a new tool to an ongoing stream of research without modifying 
it strongly. In the best case, as new tools come into being 
and are judged appropriate and valuable by people in the field, 
they alter the direction of work in the field, and the concep- 
tion of the field itself. In the worst case, we assist the 
phenomenon of "new toolism," a disease to which operations 
researchers and systems analysts seem particularly predisposed. 
Those affected by this disease "come possessed of and by 
new tools (various forms of mathematical programming, vast 
air-battle simulation machine models, queuing models and the 
like), and they look earnestly for a problem to which one of 
these tools might conceivably apply. !,22 
Pitfalls. The craft character of systems analysis can be seen 
most clearly in the concept of "pitfall." A pitfall is the sort 
of error that destroys the solution of a problem and nullifies 
the validity of a policy recommendation. Perhaps the most 
reliable way of assessing the maturity of a practical or theoret- 
ical discipline is by the degree to which the ways around its 
common pitfalls are well charted, and those encountered in the 
applications ofthe discipline to new fields of inquiry can be 
sensed in advance. Hence, the increasing realization of the 
many pitfalls which can be encountered in the application of 
systems analysis to policy problems is a sign of increasing 
maturity, rather than an admission of weakness. 
23 Quade distinguishes two categories of pitfalls in applied 
systems analysis: Those internal to the analysis itself, and 
those concerned with getting it used. Internal pitfalls are 
further subdivided into those that are inherent in all analysis, 
and those introduced by the analyst himself. Most important 
among the internal pitfalls of the first type are those associated 
with misconceptions in the treatment of uncertainty and of the 
time element, with the selection of inappropriate criteria of 
choice or measures of cost and effectiveness, with an incomplete 
analysis of feasibility conditions (e.g., the disregard of 
political and administrative constraints) and of the distribu- 
tional consequences of the proposed policy. 
Of the pitfalls introduced by the analyst, the most serious 
is probably that of personal bias, both in the form of precon- 
ceived notions concerning the nature of the problem, and of 
inflexible commitments to a given solution. Another common 
pitfall is a misplaced pragmatism which suggests "getting 
started" with the analysis, before the problem has been suffi- 
ciently understood. 
Examples of external pitfalls are many kinds of errors 
arising in the process of communicating the conclusions of 
analysis; for instance, the arguments supporting a conclusion 
may be unsuited to the type of audience ta which the analyst is 
addressing himself. 4 particular form of this pitfall is what 
Quade calls the "myth of a unique decision maker:" 
Analyses are ordinarily designed and carried out, 
although perhaps not always deliberately, as if they 
were to assist a solitary decision-maker who had full 
authority over acceptance and implementation. This 
may sometimes be the case but it is not the usual 
situation, even in the military, and almost never when 
broad social issues are involved. Even when there is 
a single decision maker his staff at a minimum supplies 
the details of any policy that is set .... Influencing 
organizational behavior can be quite different from 
influencing the behavior of an individual and, since 
we understand so little about it, can constitute a 
pitfall for policy analy~is.2~ 
In mature disciplines, the avoidance of pitfalls is accom- 
plished primarily in two ways: by the charting of standard 
paths, through a body of standard techniques which can be 
safely applied as a routine, which skirt them; and by each 
researcher becoming sensitive to the clues which indicate the 
presence of special sorts of pitfalls he is likely to encounter 
in his work. 25 systems analysts have up to now followed the 
second approach, but as experience in the conduct of analytic 
studies accumulates, we can expect that standard procedures for 
the avoidance of the most serious pitfalls will be systematically 
developed. 
5. The Components of Analysis 
Having described the activity of the applied systems ana- 
lyst as craftman's work applied to the so1ut:ion of problems 
involving intellectual constructs, it is now appropriate to 
examine the constituents making up a solution or policy proposal. 
As it turns out, the basic categories introduced by ~ristotle 
in his analysis of the craftsman's task can be adapted to our 
present purposes. 26 Aristotle examines a task in terms of four 
categories or "causes:" material, efficient, formal, and 
final. These four causes correspond, respectively, to the 
physical substance which is worked on; the activity of the agent 
in shaping it; the shape which the object finally assumes; and 
the purpose of the activity, or the functions of the object 
itself. 
In adapting the Aristotelian scheme, the crucial difference 
to be kept in mind is that the purpose ("final cause") of the 
analyst's activity is not the production of a material object 
satisfying certain requirements but the analysis of a complex 
situation and the presentation of proposals. The "form" of the 
analysis is an argument in which evidence is cited and from which 
a conclusion is drawn. In turn, the evidence will contain a 
more or less explicit description of the "efficient cause:" 
the tools, techniques, and models that have been used, and 
perhaps, difficulties and pitfalls encountered and overcome. 
Finally, the intellectual constructs and the data in whose terms 
the policy problem is formulated are the "material" component 
of the analyst's task. 
In the preceding section, I have discussed the significance 
of the abstract character of the objects of analytic inquiry, 
and the connection between the tools and the personalcraft 
judgments of the analyst. Here I shall concentrate on the 
other two constituents of analysis: the argument (with the 
important related category of evidence), and the conclusion. 
The Argument. The argument represents the link between the 
material and efficient components of the analysis and the 
conclusion. In spite of its crucial importance, surprisingly 
little has been writtzn on this topic by methodologists of 
systems analysis. The three-fold nature of the language of 
ASA (descriptive, prescriptive, argumentative) is reflected 
in the complex structure of an analytic argument, which will 
typically include mathematical and logical deductions, statis- 
tical, empirical, and analogical inferences, as well as evalu- 
ations and recommendations. This unavoidable complexity of the 
argument prevents any direct testing of its adequacy as can be 
done, for instance, in the case of a mathematical proof or a 
simple syllogism. Rather, the testing is done by applying, 
often implicitly, the criteria of adequacy that are accepted 
in a particular field, orby the particular audience to which 
the argument is directed. 
The adequacy of an analytic argument only in part can be 
judged according to scientific or professional standards; in 
fact, the nature of the testing process is more social than 
logical. This can be seen from the fact that the argument is 
never addressed to an abstract, "universal" audience, as in 
the case of purely deductive proofs, but to a particular one 
(client, decision maker, special interest group, etc.) whose 
characteristics the analyst must keep constantly in mind if 
his argument is to carry conviction and affect the course of 
events. In discussing external pitfalls, I have already 
mentioned the fallacy of assuming a monolithic decision maker, 
bbt the relation between the analyst and his audience(s) is 
more complicated than is suggested by this single consideration. 
For, while the analyst must adapt his argument to the audience 
(and this requires a careful selection of data, methods, and 
techniques of communication), it is also true that the audience 
is, to some extent, the creation of the analyst: 27 the structure 
of the argument and the style of presentation will largely 
determine the type of audience that can be reached and influenced 
by the conclusion. 
It is interesting to note that two rather typical procedures 
of systems analysis, the so-called a fortiori and break-even 
analyses, are essentially techniques of argumentation. The 
argumentative purpose is, in fact, indicated very clearly in 
the following quotation: 
More than any other single thing, the skilled use of 
a fortiori and break-even analyses separates the 
professionals from the amateurs. Most analyses should 
(conceptually) be done in two stages: a first stage to 
find out what one wants to recommend, and a second stage 
that makes the recommendations convincing even to a 
hostile and disbelieving, but intelligent audience. 2 8 
In the construction of an argument, evidence occupies a 
central position. Although the terms "facts" and "evidence" 
are often treated as synonymous in common parlance and also 
in some methodological discussions, a useful distinction can 
be made in terms of the relevant audience. "Facts" are pieces 
of (supposedly objective) information presented to an audience 
of persons who are experts in a given field. Evidence, on the 
other hand, is information embedded in an argument, for the 
purpose not so much of proving an assertion, but rather of 
convincing the audience of the reasonableness or convenience 
of a proposal. The contemporary fashion for using mathematical 
formalism at every possible point of an argument tends to 
blur this distinction, as it induces a ~zndency to accept 
statistical and other kinds of information as facts, rather 
than evidence. 
The category of evidence is most easily recognized in 
fields where problems involve both complex arguments and large 
masses of information, and where the reliability and relevance 
of the information cannot be easily assessed by standard methods. 
This is a common situation in ASA but also in other fields like 
law, where there is a highly developed "law of evidence" for 
the presentation and testing of information offered as evidence 
in court cases. In the natural sciences, on the other hand, 
one usually has either a large mass of information with a 
relatively simple argument, or a complex theoretical argument 
needing evidence at only a few points. Hence, neither descriptive 
nor theoretical natural sciences generally require highly developed 
skills in testing evidence beyond the sta3dard tests for reliability 
and relevance already involved in producing information. 29 
The assessment of the strength and fit of the evidencs is 
considerably more complicated than judgments about the validity and 
reliability of data. For this reason, there often arise disputes 
about the adequacy of a proposed solution of a policy problem 
which cannot be settled either by an examination of the data and 
information, nor by an appeal to accepted criteria of adequacy. 
Such situations seem to justify a certain skepticism of the ability 
of systems analysis to provide concrete help to the decision maker. 
It should be noted, however, that even in the field of "pure" science 
this aspect of the objectivity of scientific knowledge, which is 
really a result of a successful social tradition of producing and 
testing the materials of that knowledge, breaks down more often 
than the outside obs~rver usually assumes. 
The Conclusion. The conclusion of a policy study is not concerned 
with "things themselves," but with the intellectually constructed 
concepts and categories that can serve as the objects of an 
argument. The contact with the external world of economic, social, 
and political phenomena is always indirect. Of course, the analyst 
tries to probe as deeply as possible into the part of social 
reality with which he is concerned; but his assessment of the 
problem situation can only serve as the basis for evidence which 
is embedded in an argument whose objective validity can never be 
formally established. A different conceptualization of that reality, 
different tools, a few different personal judgments made at crucial 
points of the analysis, can always lead to radically different con- 
clusions. This is unavoidable in any-form of intellectual inquiry, 
including that of the natural scientist. Moreover, it is usually 
impossible to verify whether or not the decision maker made a right 
decision based on the analysis. One cannot be judged by what 
actually happens, for there are always circumstances beyond his 
control. Even when social experiments can be carried out, which is 
seldom, definite conclusions can hardly be expected. Not only 
because of the possibility that the experiment may not be properly 
designed or analyzed but, more significantly, because a policy 
embodies a large number of hypotheses; a negative result will 
constitute evidence against some of them, and it is usually very 
difficult to determine exactly which hypotheses are being con- 
tradicted by the experience. 
I n  sum, w e  a r e  f a c e d h e r e w i t h  a s i t u a t l o n t h a t a r i s e s  i n  many 
c o n t e x t s  i n  which some form o f  e v a l u a t i o n  t a k e s  p l a c e .  The 
n a t u r a l  tendency i s  t o  e v a l u a t e  an a c t i v i t y  by t h e  r e s u l t s  it 
produces .  T h i s  i s  n o t  o n l y  a n  i n t u i t i v e l y  a p p e a l i n g ,  b u t  a l s o  
a  r e a s o n a b l e  approach - -provided t h a t  r e a s o n a b l y  o b j e c t i v e  
c r i t e r i a  of  e v a l u a t i o n  e x i s t .  I n  such a  c a s e  knowledge o f t h e  
p r o c e s s  producing t h e  outcomes t o  b e  e v a l u a t e d  i s  l a r g e l y  imma- 
t e r i a l - - o n l y  r e s u l t s  c o u n t .  A c a r  buyer  i s  n o t  u s u a l l y  concerned 
a b o u t  t h e  i n t e r n a l  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  p roduc ing  f i r m .  But when 
t h e  f a c t u a l  and v a l u e  p remises  o f  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  a r e  moot,  when 
no o b j e c t i v e  c r i t e r i o n  f o r  what i s  a  c o r r e c t  d e c i s i o n  o r  a  good 
outcome e x i s t s ,  t h e n  t h e  p r o c e s s  o r  p rocedure  by which t h e  r e s u l t s  
a r e  o b t a i n e d  a c q u i r e s  s p e c i a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  T h i s  i s  t h e  b a s i c  
r e a s o n  why p r o c e d u r a l  q u e s t i o n s  become s o  i m p o r t a n t  i n  l e g i s l a t i v e  
and j u d i c i a l  d e c i s i o n  making. 3 1 
For  t h e  r e a s o n s  s t a t e d  above,  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  o f  a n  a n a l y t i c  
s t u d y  can  seldom be v a l i d a t e d  o r  r e f u t e d  unambiguously. Hence, 
e v a l u a t i o n  by r e s u l t s  i s  e i t h e r  i m p o s s i b l e  o r  u n f a i r  ( a s  when t h e  
q u a l i t y  o f  a n  a n a l y t i c  s t u d y  i s  e v a l u a t e d  e x c l u s i v e l y  i n  t e r m s  o f  
t h e  a c t u a l  s u c c e s s  o r  f a i l u r e  of  i t s  c o n c l u s i o n s  and recomrnenda- 
t i o n s - - t o o  many f a c t o r s  o u t s i d e  t h e  a n a l y s t ' s  c o n t r o l  d e t e r m i n e  
t h e  s u c c e s s  o r  f a i l u r e  of  a  p o l i c y ) .  E v a l u a t i o n  by p r o c e s s  becomes 
u n a v o i d a b l e ,  and i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t  t h e n o t i o n  o f  c r a f t  and c r a f t  s k i l l s  
p l a y s  a  c r u c i a l  r o l e .  
Let me recapitul~te the preceding discussion, and state 
my main conclusions in the form of theses. 
1. Evaluation and quality control are the main methodological 
issues facing ASA today. These are crucial questions not only 
for the users of analysis, but for the producers as well. 
A profession or craft may be said to exist to the extent that 
there are generally accepted standards of quality and 
criteria of criticism. 
2. The question: "How scientific is ASA?" can be made more 
meaningful by reinterpreting it in terms of two other 
questions: a) What is the language of ASA, i-e., what is 
the logical status of the different propositions which 
analysts produce in the course of their work?; and b) which 
standards of quality and rules of criticism are relevant to 
the different kinds of propositions? 
3. ASA deals with three kinds of activity: theorizing, 
choosing, and acting. Hence its language includes propositions 
of three different sorts: descriptive (scientific), 
prescriptive (advisory), and persuasive (argumentative- 
interactive). This complex mixture of description, prescrip- 
tion, and persuasion makes it impossible to apply a unique 
set of evaluative standards. 
4. The practice of the pioneers of ASA was better than their 
theory. They correctly sensed the existence of deep 
similarities between their activity as operations researchers 
and their previous activities as scientists. Their mistake, 
from our present ~erspective, was to look for the similarities 
in the outcomes of that research (explanations, predictions), 
rather than in its process. 
5. The systems analyst as craftsman goes through essentially the 
same operations that the scientist performs; and both scientist 
and analyst replicate on an abstract conceptual level what the 
traditional craftsman or artisan does with material objects 
and physical tools. The artisan applies his tools to certain 
materials in order to produce an object fulfilling a given 
function. The intellectual craftsman (analyst or scientist) 
works on abstract materials (data, concepts, theories) using 
different tools and methods (mathematical, logical, "hardware") 
in order to produce an argument supporting certain conclusions 
and/or recommendations. 
6. This anatomy of the task of the applied systems analyst 
as craftsman clearly reveals the three features discussed 
above: descriptive (data, empirical statements), prescriptive 
(recommendations, proposals, but also methodological choices 
guided by craft judgments), and persuasive (communication of 
recommendations, style of presentation, but also problem 
formulation and definitions). 
7. The notion of craft is intimately related to that of quality 
standards. Indeed, the main function of the master craftsman 
(and also, to some extent, of the patrons and connoisseurs of 
the craft) is creating standards of quality for the other 
practitioners. These standards usually remain inarticulate 
(they are taught more by example than by preaching), but 
they are nonetheless quite effective in guiding and controlling 
the work of the craftsmen. Scientific leaders fulfill similar 
functions for their disciplines, with the susport of institu- 
tional mechanisms like professional organizations, refereed 
journals, and academies. 
8. The search for relevant standards of quality in ASA has been 
impeded by misconceptions about the nature of the "scientific 
method" -- by the assumption that analytic work could be judged 
in terms of results, of "correct" explanations and successful 
predictions. But the profession is beginning to understand 
that quality control (in the case of ASA as of all other 
intellectual activities) is intimately related to a sophisti- 
cated understanding of process. 
9. ASA is still quite young as an intellectual craft, and 
quality criteria develop very slowly. We still lack a 
sufficient body of first-class studies from which relevant 
criteria could be distilled. But there is enough experience, 
by now, to suggest at least minimal criteria of adequacy. 
Such criteria can be derived by studying the most serious 
conceptual errors into which analysts occasionally fall 
(in collecting and analyzing data, in choosing tools, in 
drawing conclusions, and in communicating them). Thus, by 
identifying the pitfalls of analysis and charting safe paths 
around them, we are slowly building a solid foundation on 
which subtler criteria of quality can be based. 
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